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THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS CASE LOAD*
William 0. Douglast
Myths grow up around our institutions. Some about the Supreme
Court have slender roots in facts. Others are products of fantasy. Jus-
tices, as everyone knows, are assigned to Circuits of which there are
eleven. The legend persists, even in legal circles, that all petitions for
certiorari go only to the Justice in whose Circuit the litigation arises,
with him reporting the case to the full Court. Yet there never has been-
nor is there now-any division of work in the Court until the opinion
is assigned for writing after the case has been argued, discussed at
Conference and voted upon.
For years it was the practice of the Court on Mondays to commence
the session by reading or announcing opinions. The next item of business
was the admission of attorneys. Sometimes the announcement of opin-
ions took several hours; at times it ran over into the next day. Sponsors
of attorneys were kept waiting. Some of them were busy practitioners;
others were Senators and Congressmen who wanted to pay this courtesy
to an important constituent but to do so often were forced to miss im-
portant roll calls. Why the announcement of opinions came first was
lost in mists of history. Myths grew up about it. The myth that opin-
ions must come first was part of the great ceremonials attached to the
Court. Those who tinkered with ceremonials were sometimes charged
with undermining the institution itself. To his eternal credit Chief
Justice Fred Vinson, without priot authorization of the Conference,
opened the 1948 Term on October 4, 1948, by first admitting the at-
torneys. That has continued to this day; and in time new myths may
grow up concerning it.
There is the myth that has received great impetus since Brown v.
Board of Education.' It is that the Court made an exception in those
school segregation cases and picked them out as the occasion to rely
* This article was delivered as the forty-third Frank Irvine Lecture at the Cornell
Law School on April 8, 1960.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 558, for biographical data.
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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on "sociological" data, not on law or precedents. Yet those who work
in constitutional law know that business facts, economic data, institu-
tional practices, and social materials often are relevant to enlightened
decisions on constitutional issues. The Brandeis brief, filed in 1908 in
Muller v. Oregon,' and containing vast citations to economic and social
data bearing on the hours of work by women, is the classical example.
I mention these myths in passing. It is about another that I wish
to say a few words-the idea that the Court is overworked, that if the
Court were only relieved by statute or by voluntary action of some of
the cases it would make "better" decisions.
Critics of the Court put the problem in various lights. For example
the December 14, 1959, issue of the New York Times, in commenting
on the workload of the Supreme Court, said:
The Supreme Court has already taken on all the cases it will have time
to hear and decide by the end of its term next June. Any cases on which
the court grants review from now on . . . will not be argued until next
fall. The only exception would be for an emergency. . . . As a practical
matter, then, a lawyer who brings a case to the court during the rest of
this term and succeeds in getting full review can expect as much as a year
to pass before final decision. . . . This time schedule is not a new devel-
opment. It has become a normal state of affairs in the Supreme Court.
The underlying reason is, of course, the volume of work. The number
of cases brought to the court is extremely large, and it is steadily grow-
ing.
It is surprising to find the reliable Times-so long a faithful reporter
of the Court's work-making these assertions.
What the Times overlooked are the changes we made in our Rules,
effective July 1, 1954. Under the old Rules a petition for certiorari
had to be accompanied by a printed record. The records in certiorari
cases from most federal courts were printed for use of the court below
and it was necessary for our Clerk's office to print only the appellate
court proceedings before certiorari was granted. That was also true of a
few state court cases. If certiorari was granted it was, however, generally
necessary to reprint additional copies to comply with the Rules. Yet
in spite of these facts in many instances a case on certiorari could be
readied for argument after granting the petition merely by preparing
and filing the briefs. Under the new Rules, neither in certiorari nor in
appeals is a printed record necessary until certiorari is granted or the
appeal noted. Hence, except where printed records are available from
the lower court, the printing must take place after the Court agrees to
hear the case. Moreover, under the new Rules it now takes a long time
to prepare a case for argument.
2 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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The parties now have a total of thirty days to designate the parts
of the record to be printed.3
The Clerk has numerous duties to perform concerning the record, as
provided in Rule 36. The time required for performance of those duties
plus the printing of the record varies with the length and complexity of
the record. It will run from ten days to ninety days or more. If printed
copies of the record are available from the lower court, they may be
used and the time is accordingly saved as indicated by Rule 41. The
average time for performance of the functions of the Clerk under Rule
36 and for printing of the record is thirty days.
Counsel for appellant or petitioner has thirty days after receipt of the
printed record from the Clerk to file his printed brief on the merits.4
Counsel for appellee or respondent has thirty days to file his brief
after receipt by him of the brief filed by appellant or petitioner.'
Cases are "normally" not called for argument less than fourteen
days after the brief of appellee or respondent has been filed." Thus the
petitioner or appellant has time to familiarize himself with the opposing
brief and file a reply if he desires.
Thus 134 days, or four and a half months, usually elapse before a
case which we have agreed to hear is ready for argument.7 Therefore,
petitions granted or appeals noted in early January would not normally
be ready for argument until mid-May. And by that time we are usually
preoccupied with clearing opinions in cases already argued. We some-
times, however, hear cases argued in May; and usually we have two
weeks of argument in April. Of the twenty-five cases argued in April
1959, thirteen had been granted or noted the previous December. Of
the ten cases argued in May 1959, three had been granted or noted in
December, four had been granted or noted in January, and one even
later.
In our February 1960 session we heard one case in which the petition
had been filed late in the previous month. Our March 1960 session in-
cluded two cases where the petitions had been granted in December
1959; scheduled for argument during April 1960 are two cases which we
agreed to hear the previous December and, one in which certiorari was
3 See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rules 17 and 26.
4 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 41(1).
5 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 42(2).
6 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 43 (1).
7 There is no comparable figure for the pre-1954 cases because no statistics were kept
as to when they were ready for argument. But a complete check of the cases argued in the
1950 and 1951 terms shows that petitions for certiorari and appeals were argued, on the
average, within 70 days after the grant, or the noting of jurisdiction respectively.
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granted in January; and our May 1960 session will include five cases
granted review in December.
It is, however, the liberal time allowance and the change in the require-
ment for printing records provided by our revised Rules for the benefit
of the parties, not any increase in our work, that is mostly responsible
for putting over to another term most certioraris granted and appeals
noted from January on.
Some say we spend too much time on cases involving the jury's func-
tion under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The relevant statistics
are reviewed in Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co.'
Of the 110 petitions for certiorari filed during the last decade, seventy-
three were filed by employees and thirty-seven were filed by employers.
Of these, thirty-three were granted, each at the instance of an employee
who complained of the lower court's withholding the case from the jury
or overturning a jury verdict in his favor. Thirty cases were reversed
for usurpation of the jury function; and in each of three the lower
court's decision was sustained.
Of the seventy-seven petitions denied, thirty-two were by employees
who sought reversal of a lower court's decision to withhold the case
from the jury or to upset a jury's verdict. Eight more employees wanted
the Court to overturn jury verdicts rendered in the employers' favor.
Of the petitions filed by employers, thirty-five asked the Court to
reverse a lower court decision upholding a jury verdict or holding that
the case should have been submitted to a jury. Employers in two other
petitions complained of the lower court's action in setting aside a
jury verdict and granting a new trial.
As to the thirty-three cases in which the Court granted certiorari
during this ten-year period, sixteen were summarily reversed without
oral argument and without full opinions. Only seventeen cases were
argued during this period and of these five were disposed of by brief
per curiam opinions. Only twelve cases in over ten years were argued,
briefed and disposed of with full opinions by the Court. The Court
granted certiorari in these cases on an average of less than three per
year and has given plenary consideration to slightly more than one per
year.
Some long-range statistics will help put the over-all problem of the
case load of the Court in perspective. During the last two decades
there has been a marked decline in the number of opinions written each
term.
8 361 U.S. 15, 20-25 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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Cases Cases disposed
Opinions disposed of of by
Year of Court by opinion per curiams*
1938 ................ 139 174 65
1939 ................ 137 151 97
1940 ................ 165 195 86
1941 ................ 151 175 63
1942 ................ 147 196 63
1943 ................ 130 154 56
1944 ................ 156 199 75
1945 ................ 136 173 45
1946 ................ 142 190 66
1947 ................ 110 143 65
1948 ................ 114 147 91
1949 ................ 87 108 94
1950 ................ 91 114 77
1951 ................ 83 96 101
1952 ................ 104 123 71
1953 ................ 65 84 86
1954 ................ 78 86 102
1955 ................ 82 103 127
1956 ................ 100 112 135
1957 ................ 104 125 188
1958 ................ 99 116 135
If the number of signed petitions and per curiams (not including
mere orders of dismissal, affirmance, etc.) are counted (irrespective of
the number of cases they dispose of) the following is the result:
Number of Number of
Term Opinions Term Opinions
1927 ............... 175 1943 ............... 136
1928 ............... 129 1944 ............... 162
1929 ............... 137 1945 ............... 136
1930 ............... 167 1946 ............... 143
1931 ............... 150 1947 ............... 118
1932 ............... 169 1948 ............... 123
1933 ............... 164 1949 ............... 100
1934 ............... 169 1950 ............... 100
1935 ............... 158 1951 ............... 95
1936 ............... 162 1952 ............... 112
1937 ............... 171 1953 ............... 78
1938 ............... 150 1954 ............... 82
1939 ............... 143 1955 ............... 95
1940 ............... 169 1956 ............... 115
1941 ............... 162 1957 ............... 118
1942 ............... 170 1958 ............... 116
Until recently we heard arguments five days a week, holding our con-
ferences on Saturday. Since the 1955 Term we have heard argument
four days a week and had our conferences on Friday. The five-day week
* Orders of dismissal, affirmance, etc., as well as per curiam opinions.
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is symbolic of a slower pace. Now we have two days a week off rather
than one and make up for that lost time by scheduling extra weeks of
argument when necessary and prolonging the duration of the term.
The slower pace of the Court is reflected in the following table show-
ing the number of hours of argument in each term since 1938 and the
date of adjournment.
Number of hours
Term of argument
1938 .................. 296
1939 .................. 300
1940 .................. 296
1941 .................. 316
1942 .................. 304
1943 .................. 284
1944 .................. 304
1945 .................. 280
1946 .................. 304
1947 .................. 260
1948 .................. 264
1949 .................. 204
1950 .................. 205
1951 .................. 212
1952 .................. 228
1953 .................. 176
1954 .................. 190
1955 .................. 192
1956 .................. 216
1957 .................. 216
1958 .................. 220
Date of
adjournment
June 5, 1939
June 3, 1940
June 2, 1941
June 8, 1942
June 21, 1943
June 12, 1944
June 18, 1945
June 10, 1946
June 23, 1947
June 21, 1948
June 27, 1949
June 5, 1950
June 4, 1951
June 9, 1952
June 15, 1953
June 7, 1954
June 6, 1955
June 11, 1956
July 11, 1957
June 30, 1958
June 29, 1959
To be sure the total number of cases filed rose from 942 in the 1938
Term, to 1,510 in the 1946 Term, to 1,816 in the 1958 Term. But these
totals are not too revealing. The increase has been due almost entirely to
the flood of in forma pauperis cases9 which have been filed in increasing
numbers since 1938. From an almost insignificant position in the
Court's business these cases have grown to constitute more than half of
all cases filed.Y0 Illustrative is the number of petitions for certiorari in
forma pauperis filed each term:
9 These cases today appear on the Miscellaneous Docket. They are not the only items
on that docket, as other cases-which are paid for by the parties-also appear there.
Illustrative of the latter are motions for extraordinary writs. See In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1 (1946); Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1958). But the paid-for cases on the
Miscellaneous Docket average only about 7 a year.
The Miscellaneous Docket was created in 1945. Beginning in 1947 petitions for certiorari
in forma pauperis were transferred to that docket; and the appeals were added in 1954.
Prior to 1938 the number of these cases had been quite small. After the creation of the
Miscellaneous Docket a case, which was on it, was transferred to the Appellate Docket
once the petition for certiorari was granted or the appeal noted.
10 Indigent litigants usually seek review by petition for certiorari but relief is also
pursued by appeal and by motions for extraordinary relief. In the 1958 Term there were
filed, in forma paupers, 25 appeals, 116 motions for various forms of relief, and 772 peti-
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1938 ................
1939 ................
1940 ................
1941 ................
1942 ................
1943 ................
1944 ................
1945 ................
1946 ................
1947 ................
1948 ................
1949 ................
1950 ................
1951 ................
1952 ................
1953 ................
1954 .............
1955 ................
1956 ................
1957 ................
1958. ............
The great increase in the number of these cases since 1938 is partly
due to Johnson v. Zerbst," which was decided on May 23 of that year.
Prior to then the concept of "jurisdiction" of a court which could be
challenged by habeas corpus was quite narrow. Johnson v. Zerbst held,
quite properly I think, that a court could not deprive an accused of a
constitutional right in a trial and have "jurisdiction" to deprive him
of life or liberty. Observance of all constitutional guarantees was a
"jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty."' 2 And so, the "jailhouse lawyers" who
seem to be always present in every prison combed case after case to
see if some inmate had not been deprived of a constitutional right.
The claims made are often fantastic, surpassing credulity. They are
for the most part frivolous. The number of petitions for certiorari in
forma pauperis which were granted during each of the past twenty-one
terms is as follows:
1938 .................
1939 ............
1940................
1941 .................
1942 .................
1943 .................
1944 .................
1945 .................
1946 .................
1947 .................
1948 .................
1949 .................
1950 .................
1951 .................
1952 .................
1953 .................
1954 .................
1955 .................
1956 .................
1957 .................
1958 .................
The rate over the twenty-one year period at which petitions in forma
pauperis have been granted is less than 4%.
These in forma pauperis cases have produced a great variety of
problems.
tions for certiorari, bringing the grand total of cases filed in forma pauperis during the
term to 913. During the same period there were 903 cases filed by nonindigents. Com-
parable figures are not available for the years prior to 1945, because until then motions
for extraordinary relief did not receive a docket number unless the motions were granted.
11 304 U.S. 4S8 (1938).
12 304 U.S. at 467.
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The remedy by habeas corpus has at times been used to test old and
stale claims. Redenbaugh v. Rigg,'3 where relief was denied, reached
back into a state trial held forty-three years earlier. Review by certiorari
of cases filed on the Miscellaneous Docket under the head of habeas
corpus14 and other post-convictions remedies15 has produced numerous
important cases. Other significant criminal cases coming by the cer-
tiorari route have also reached the Court by this docket."8 It has
produced cases posing critical procedural problems touching on state-
federal relations in the criminal field.17  One of the most important
functions performed by this docket has been to furnish hearings or
other relief in lower courts to petitioners clamoring for adjudication
of their constitutional rights.'" These cases have at times resulted in
resentencing. 9 Issues of citizenship have been resolved.20 And a wide
variety of litigation on the civil side has resulted.2' After working with
the in Jorma pauperis22 cases on the Miscellaneous Docket over a
period of years, I am confident that the manner in which the Court
manages them dispenses justice at a level long neglected in the nation.
Moreover, cases like Moore v. Dempsey,23 from Arkansas (on the Ap-
pellate Docket) and Leyra v. Denno2 4 (an in forma pauperis case), from
New York are eloquent witnesses of the high function performed by
federal habeas corpus in state criminal proceedings.
Mr. Justice Stone wrote in 1928 that "by the end of another term
the Court may be able to hear cases on their merits as soon after they
are docketed as counsel are prepared to present them.' 2 5 And he saw
hope in the fact that cases carried over from that term had dropped
to 125. But as the volume of cases filed mounted, the number carried
over increased, as the following table shows:
13 362 U.S. - (1960).
14 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); Breit-
haupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Lee v.
Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
15 Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16 See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156
(1953); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181 (1952) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
17 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
-8 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956);
Noto v. United States, 351 U.S. 902 (1956); Edwards v. United States, 355 U.S. 36 (1957);
Howard v. United States, 356 U.S. 25 (1958); McGann v. United States, 352 U.S. 904
(1956); Hoffman v. Circuit Court, 343 U.S. 972 (1952); Poret v. Sigler, 361 U.S. 375
(1960).
19 See Christoffel v. United States, 345 U.S. 947 (1953).
20 See Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
21 Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 27 (1958); Williams v. Simmons, 355 U.S. 49; Far Eastern
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342
U.S. 359 (1952).
22 See Douglas, "In Forma Pauperis Practice in the United States," 2 N.H.B.J. 5 (1959).
23 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
24 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
25 Stone, "Fifty Years' Work of the U.S. Supreme Court," 14 A.B.A.J. 428, 435 (1928).
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Term Cases Term Cases
1925 ................ 438 1942 ................ 111
1926 ................ 283 1943 ................ 147
1927 ................ 175 1944 ................ 133
1928 ................ 125 1945 ................ 156
1929 ................ 172 1946 ................ 146
1930 ................ 123 1947 ................ 119
1931 ................ 120 1948 ................ 158
1932 ................ 110 1949 ................ 127
1933 ................ 88 1950 ................ 111
1934 ................ 96 1951 ................ 137
1935 ................ 90 1952 ................ 140
1936 ................ 98 1953 ................ 149
1937 ................ 65 1954 ................ 194
1938 ................ 85 1955 ................ 208
1939 ................ 121 1956 ................ 340*
1940 ................ 115 1957 ................ 213
1941 ................ 124 1958 ................ 269
Yet the reduction in obligatory jurisdiction as a result of the 1925
Act20 6 made it possible for the Court to hear on the regular calendar-
for the first time in 100 years-cases docketed during the term. Today
petitions for certiorari granted or appeals noted during the first three
months of a term are generally heard during that term.
The Appellate Docket which comprises about 90% of the meritorious
cases has not increased greatly in size. The number of cases filed in
the 1958 Term was only a few more than the number filed in the 1938
Term. There has in fact been no upward trend in these cases during
the past two decades. The number of cases filed on the Appellate
Docket (excluding in forma pauperis) is as follows:
1938 ................ 857 1949 ................ 718
1939 ................ 861 1950 ................ 659
1940 ................ 853 1951 ................ 716
1941 ................ 997 1952 ................ 742
1942 ................ 832 1953 ................ 684
1943 ................ 782 1954 ................ 713
1944 ................ 896 1955 ................ 891
1945 ................ 791 1956 ................ 974
1946 ................ 828 1957 ................ 826
1947 ................ 716 1958 ................ 886
1948 ................ 773
* This large number is explained by the fact that this term was extended to July 11,
1957, in order to hear Wilson v. Girard, 354 US. 524. All cases filed until July 11, 1957,
were therefore included in the number carried over.
26 43 Stat. 936 (1925). For accounts of the Court's work and case load immediately
prior to the 1925 Act see Frankfurter & Landis, "The Business of the Supreme Court
of the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System," 40 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 834,
1110 (1927); Shelton, "The Danger of the Increased Burden Upon the Federal Supreme
Court from Its Continually Expanding Docket," 92 Cent. L.J. 279, 280 (1921).
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Our certiorari jurisdiction is invoked quite sparingly. In no term
since the 1925 Act has the Court granted more than 22o of the peti-
tions for certiorari. The percentages for the last six terms (if the in
forma pauperis cases are included are):
Percent Percent
Term granted Term granted
1953 ............... 7.9 1956 ............... 12.4
1954 ............... 10.5 1957 ............... 9.8
1955 ............... 10.2 1958 ............... 8.9
If cases on the Appellate Docket are alone considered, the percentages
are as follows:
Percent Percent
Term granted Term granted
1953 ............... 13.0 1956 ............... 17.3
1954 ............... 16.9 1957 ............... 14.1
1955 ............... 16.1 1958 ............... 14.4
Moreover, the practice of the Court has been to dispose of more and
more appeals on motions to dismiss or affirm. A review of the dis-
position of appeals reported in volumes 350 through 360 of the United
States Reports shows the following:
Appeals from Court of Appeals (28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2)):
Summary disposition .................................. 15
Argued ............................................. 0
Appeals from state courts (28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), (2) ):
Summary disposition ................................. 272
Argued ............................................. 41
Appeals from District Courts:
Three-judge courts (28 U.S.C. § 1253) :
Summary disposition ............................. 80
Argued ......................................... 52
Civil actions brought by U.S. (15 U.S.C. § 29):
Summary disposition .............................. 10
Argued ......................................... 8
Appeal by U.S. in criminal actions (18 U.S.C. § 3731):
Summary disposition .............................. 7
Argued ......................................... 10
Where Act of Congress held unconstitutional (28 U.S.C.
§ 1252):
Summary disposition .............................. 1
Argued ......................................... 1
[Vol. 45
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Miscellaneous:
Summary disposition .............................. 9
Argued ......................................... 0
This is made possible by reason of several facts. The bulk of these
cases, as noted, are appeals from state courts and appeals from three-
judge District Courts. The appeals from state courts-where a state
statute has been upheld against a claim of unconstitutionality-quite
frequently involve no substantial question in light of the broad discretion
which legislatures have since the end of the regime which produced such
products as Tyson & Brother v. Banton," and in light of the more
settled pattern of constitutional law in other fields. And the three-judge
court cases-at least so far as they involve ICC orders-frequently are
plowing fields which have been pretty well marked by earlier decisions.
The fact that about three-fourths of the appeals are now disposed
of on motions to dismiss or affirm does not mean that the Court has
converted an obligatory jurisdiction into a discretionary one. It means
merely that the fields involved in these appeals do not need the de-
lineation that was once necessary.
The upshot of these statistics is that we have fewer oral arguments
than we once had, fewer opinions to write, and shorter weeks to work.
I do not recall any time in my twenty years or more of service on the
Court when we had more time for research, deliberation, debate, and
meditation.
This does not mean that the load is necessarily less onerous today
than it was twenty years ago. Cases are not fungible. Fewer cases in
one term may indeed make for more work than a larger number in an-
other one. We have not had in recent years many involved and lengthy
records such as those in Ecker v. Western Pac. R. Corp.,28 Group of
Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co.,9 Nebraska v. Wyoming,30 R.F.C. v.
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co.,31 New York v. United States,32 Daleite v.
United States,33 and Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States.3 4
We use the summary calendar frequently,35 as shown by the following
table:
27 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
28 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
29 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
30 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
31 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
32 331 U.S. 284 (1947).
33 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
34 323 U.S. 386 (1945). But see United States v. du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
35 This first appeared in the Rules promulgated December 22, 1911. See 222 U.S. App.
p. 11. It is presently covered by our Rule 44, par. 3. Cases on the summary calendar are
argued in one hour, which is half the time ordinarily allotted other cases.
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Term Cases Term Cases
1938 ................ 0 1949 ................ 46
1939 ................ 0 1950 ................ 37
1940 ................ 0 1951 ................ 64
1941 ................ 11 1952 ................ 70
1942 ................ 31 1953 ................ 29
1943 ................ 32 1954 ................ 36
1944 ................ 66 1955 ................ 58
1945 ................ 43 1956 ................ 74
1946 ................ 41 1957 ................ 46
1947 ................ 21 1958 ................ 58
1948 ................ 33
These cases commonly present a "small sirloin of law" divorced from
complicated facts.
Yet small records often present tangled skeins as difficult to unravel
as the multiplicity of facts in a lengthy record. Chief Justice Stone,
shortly before his death in 1946, expressed the view that the difficulty
of the cases had increased since his arrival on the bench in 1925. Cer-
tainly when old fields are being plowed there is less complexity than
when new ones are opened. Since World War II the Court has had to
explore many new areas. The war power is one. The reach of the First
and Fifth Amendments is another. The mounting legislation by the
States and the National Government leads to conflicts and collisions
at an increasing rate. Working out these delicate state-federal relation-
ships is often a difficult task. The intrusion of government into the
privacy of individual lives-what a person thinks, what he reads, how
he casts his vote, with whom he associates-has raised monumental
problems. The reconciliation of the legislative power to investigate with
the civil rights of citizens has presented issues more delicate and more
profound than any other like questions ever tendered the Court. The
position of minorities-which may be uncomplicated in theory-often
presents troublesome questions because of the muddy and unclear rec-
ords which have been made below.
Each age brings the Court its own special worries, anxieties, and
concerns. The main outlines of the life of the nation are mirrored in
the cases filed with us. What we are often asked to decide are ques-
tions in which important blocs of opinion in the nation have fixed and
set opinions that no amount of argument would change. The Court
sits in a maelstrom which has increased in intensity with the growth of
blocs and pressure groups. Key, in Politics, Parties and Pressure
Groups,36 shows how our pluralistic society has multiplied the pressure
groups, making them more and more vocal.
36 (4th ed. 1958).
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Economic forces, social groups, racial and religious minorities press
their claims. The individual has rights against all governments. There
are limits beyond which no branch of government may go; there are pro-
cedures which each must follow. The States have prerogatives; yet they
also live under a federal regime that sets limits to their actions and
by reason of the Supremacy Clause subordinates their laws if they are
in conflict with the federal rule. States also have claims against other
States which may be resolved under the original jurisdiction of the
Court. Here too the United States and one or more of the States may
litigate their differences. These make up the grist in the Court's mill.
Those who have worked long with legal problems know that not all
"law" is to be found in books. There is much of it to be found in ex-
perience, seasoned contacts with practical affairs, insight into the whole
of society, appraisal of political realities. One who reads a statute often
needs more than a dictionary if he is to have understanding. He needs
insight into the nature of the organism with which the statute deals.
The problem is different only in degree when one construes a Constitution
written in general terms for an indefinite future.
The problems with which the Court deals are largely unfamiliar to
common-law courts. They cover a range and have a complexity for which
there is no adequate prior training. Certainly the practice of law never
touches the wide variety of problems with which the Court deals. Most
offices never have any question under the Bill of Rights. Fields such
as patents, admiralty, bankruptcy, taxation tend to become specialized.
Lawyers from the largest or smallest firms in the country who reach the
Court work for years in unfamiliar fields. So do judges from lower
courts. It takes a decade or more to run the length of the course and
become familiar with its various features.
There is the myth that somehow experience on other courts give the
"judicial" attitude necessary for the Court's work. We have had great
Justices from state and lower federal courts. Apart from present mem-
bership, Cardozo, Holmes, White, Rutledge, Vinson, and Taft are among
them. Apart also from present membership, we would never have had
Marshall, Taney, Miller, Waite, Brandeis, Stone, Jackson, or even
Hughes for his first term of service, if prior judicial experience were a
requirement.
No formula will, I think, produce the men and women we need for
the smooth workings of our federalism. All fields of experience make
distinct contributions to the problems which our federalism generates.
The work of Justice Murphy is an excellent example.37 Judges, like
37 The unique contributions of justice Murphy (who bad spent most of his life
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the cases with which they deal, are more than statistics. The electronics
industry-resourceful as it is-will never produce a machine to handle
these problems. They are delicate and imponderable, complex and
tangled. They require at times the economist's understanding, the
poet's insight, the executive's experience, the political scientist's under-
standing, the historian's perspective. As respecting the Court's adjudica-
tion of these varied issues, I make the same observations that Lord
Haldane made in 1921 when he spoke about the work of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council: ". . you cannot study it sufficiently
merely in text-books or documents. The only way to study it is to
watch it."13 8
in various branches of the public service after some early years as practitioner, prosecutor,
and law teacher) are appraised in Gressman, "Mr. Justice Murphy-A Preliminary Ap-
praisal," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 29 (1950); Marshall, "Mr. Justice Murphy and Civil Rights,"
9 Natl B.J. 1 (1951); Frank, "Justice Murphy: The Goals Attempted," 59 Yale L.J. 1
(1949); Man, "Mr. Justice Murphy and the Supreme Court," 36 Va. L. Rev. 889 (1950).
38 Haldane, "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," 1 Camb. L.J. 143, 155
(1922).
